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Workplace automation, that is technological capital which may substitute 
labour in the production process, has garnered increasing attention both 
within and outside research. In advanced economies, there is growing concern 
about the extent to which automation affects employment patterns, and thus 
the level of risk which workers may face from such labour market disruption. 
There are also worries that elevated automation risk may generate substantial 
political fallout, namely automation-driven grievances that feedback into the 
political process. In this regard, I ask: how does automation risk affect 
individual workers’ support for social policies and party choice? I focus 
particularly on its impact on workers’ support for benefit conditionality 
policies and radical right parties. I argue that the impact of automation risk on 
these two political outcomes may be traced to automation-vulnerable workers’ 
fear of status decline and concern about welfare competition. These worries 
may emanate from workers’ elevated automation risk, even if they do not 
actually become unemployed from automation.  
Benefit conditionality policies apply stringent obligations like accepting 
available albeit worse jobs, and sanctions like unemployment benefit cuts to 
pressure unemployed workers into reemployment. They have become 
prevalent because they enable governments to achieve cost savings, an 
objective which has become pressing under permanent austerity. Automation-
vulnerable workers may reject benefit conditionality because its stringent 
obligations and sanctions may exacerbate their economic vulnerabilities. 
However, they may yet support benefit conditionality if they consider their 
worries about status decline and welfare competition to be more salient than 
their worries about the economic costs of benefit conditionality.  
These worries may have electoral implications. If automation risk 
manifests primarily as worries about status decline and welfare competition, 
automation-vulnerable workers may prefer parties that address such 
concerns. Furthermore, if automation-vulnerable workers support benefit 
conditionality, they may prefer parties that support such policies. In Western 
Europe today, radical right parties’ appeals speak to these concerns and 
preferences. Automation-vulnerable workers may thus support radical right 
parties based on their status decline and welfare competition worries, and 
their support for benefit conditionality. 
This study investigates these political implications of automation risk in 
West European countries by exploiting cross-national individual-level surveys 
from the European Social Survey. I find that automation-vulnerable workers 
support benefit conditionality policies that obligate unemployed workers to 
accept worse jobs, namely lower wage or educationally mismatched jobs. This 
finding may indicate that these workers find welfare competition and status 
decline worries more salient than potential economic costs which they may 
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suffer from benefit conditionality. These worries may also explain their 
preference for radical right parties over other party families.  
These findings contribute to two literatures: (a) determinants of public 
support for benefit conditionality policies, and (b) political consequences of 
automation. Concerning the first literature, I show that risk is an important 
determinant of support for benefit conditionality policies, and its impact 
should be disentangled from that of current employment status. However, and 
through the case of automation, I demonstrate that risk may manifest different 
worries and threats, even non-economic ones, which may likewise affect 
benefit conditionality support. Concerning the second literature, I echo recent 
studies which show that automation-vulnerable workers’ support for radical 
right parties may be traced to their status worries. I however add that 
automation-vulnerable workers’ concerns about welfare competition and 
support for benefit conditionality may complement status-based explanations 
for radical right parties. Overall, this dissertation highlights the need to go 
beyond economic factors such as unemployment risk, and consider how non-
economic factors such as worries about status decline and welfare competition 
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Today, there is greater attention on the effects of workplace automation. A rich 
literature highlights that workplace automation, namely computers and 
robots, has disrupted existing employment structures in advanced capitalist 
economies, which in turn leads to significant socio-political consequences 
(Kurer and Palier, 2019). Most economists acknowledge that automation has 
led to substantial changes in employment structures, but disagree on the scale 
and shape of these changes (contrast Fernández-Macías and Hurley, 2017; 
Goos et al., 2014). Irrespective of these differences, a burgeoning political 
science literature contends that the uneven labour market effects of 
automation yield differences in political behaviour (Anelli et al., 2019; Kurer, 
2020; Thewissen and Rueda, 2017).  
This link between individual-level exposure to automation risk and policy 
attitudes is relevant from a policy perspective. Public support for policies may 
restrict their implementation and reform (Häusermann and Palier, 2017), and 
even party choice (Lindvall and Rueda, 2014). This dissertation hence explores 
the impact of automation risk on benefit conditionality, and examines the 
impact of automation risk on party choice within this policy context (Figure 1). 
I consider this relationship as one possible channel by which the political 
consequences of automation may unfurl. This channel reflects a typical 
comparative political economy framework relating the political implications 
of labour market transformations to issue concerns and policy preferences 
(e.g. Gidron and Hall, 2019; Häusermann and Kriesi, 2015; Lindvall and 




Figure 1. Expected relationship between automation risk, support for benefit 
conditionality, and party choice. 
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The focus on benefit conditionality policies is motivated by their growing 
prevalence in West European welfare states, despite their electoral 
divisiveness (Bengtsson et al., 2017; Fossati, 2018). By benefit conditionality, 
I mean policies which target unemployed workers by imposing stringent 
obligations on their unemployment benefit recipiency and enforcing sanctions 
when these obligations are unmet. Obligations may include attaching 
unemployment benefit recipiency to accepting available jobs, even worse 
paying or mismatched ones. Sanctions may take the form of temporary 
unemployment benefit cuts (Knotz, 2018). Benefit conditionality policies, 
which are part of a family of activation policies, have been variously termed as 
“demanding” labour market policies (LMP) (Fossati, 2018), “negative” LMP 
(Taylor-Gooby, 2004), or “defensive” LMP (Torfing, 1999). These policies may 
have become prevalent because they allow governments to find cost savings 
when governments face cost containment pressures during permanent 
austerity, especially after the Great Financial Crisis (Bengtsson et al., 2017). 
The authors find that governments have spent more on cheaper but harsher 
benefit conditionality policies than expensive but human capital improving 
labour market policies such as training since the onset of austerity.1 Benefit 
conditionality reduces social expenditure by restricting unemployed workers’ 
access to their benefits, thus pressuring them into reemployment.  
A burgeoning literature on determinants of public support for benefit 
conditionality shows that unemployed workers oppose these policies, but 
employed workers support them (Buss, 2018; Fossati, 2018). It is however 
ambivalent on how employed workers in risky jobs, such as jobs threatened by 
automation, view benefit conditionality (e.g. Garritzmann et al., 2018; p. 857). 
The divisiveness of such policies also means that the public’s support for such 
policies may have electoral consequences (see Lindvall and Rueda, 2014). If 
governments pursue divisive benefit conditionality policies, these policies may 
become salient during elections like in the 2019 Finnish parliamentary 
elections. Voters’ support for such policies may then influence their party 
choice. 
It is therefore relevant to explore how automation risk may affect benefit 
conditionality support, and thus party choice. To do so, it is prudent to first 
consider which workers are at risk and the types of concerns that they face. 
Most studies which examine the impact of automation on occupational 
employment shares find that middle-skilled occupations containing repetitive 
and easily-codified (routine) tasks have declined substantially in Western 
Europe and the United States (US) (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Goos et al., 
2014; Peugny, 2019). By contrast, they find that low-skilled and high-skilled 
occupations containing unstructured cognitive, interactive, and/or physical 
tasks have grown. Although a handful of studies contest this routine-biased 
technological change (RBTC) view (Fernández-Macías and Hurley, 2017; 
 
1 See Bonoli (2013) and Hemerijck (2017) who compare benefit 
conditionality and enabling LMPs. 
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Oesch and Rodríguez, 2011), a recent meta-review by Biagi and Sebastian 
(2020) shows that most of the landmark studies concur that automation 
affects routine occupations most. The RBTC perspective would thus suggest 
that workers in routine occupations face the greatest threat of unemployment 
owing to automation. Paradoxically, recent studies which track routine 
workers’ individual labour market trajectories find that most routine workers 
‘survive’ in their routine jobs (Kurer and Gallego, 2019; Kurer, 2020); only a 
minority become unemployed thus far. They find that declines in employment 
shares of routine occupations result from high entry rates (new workers 
entering these occupations) rather than high exit rates (existing workers 
leaving these occupations). Simply put, routine workers face a higher threat of 
unemployment than non-routine workers, but this threat may not materialise 
as actual unemployment. These findings hence beg the question: if routine 
workers do not face looming unemployment, what concerns do they then face 
which may affect their support for benefit conditionality, and thus party 
choice?  
I argue that the threat of automation may manifest as two concerns for 
routine workers, namely welfare competition and status decline, which may 
affect support for benefit conditionality. Although declining labour demand in 
routine occupations may yield lower entry rates than higher exit rates, routine 
workers may still worry about their employment circumstance. Research 
shows that workers respond to the risk of unemployment, even if this risk does 
not materialise into actual unemployment (Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Rehm, 
2009; Rovny and Rovny, 2017). Existing studies show that individuals facing 
elevated risk worry about welfare competition because they may come to rely 
on unemployment benefits in the future (Golding and Middleton, 1982; Jeene 
et al., 2014; Maasen and De Goede, 1989). It is thus plausible that routine 
workers may also worry about welfare competition. Routine workers may view 
currently unemployed workers as competitors of scarce unemployment 
benefits. Benefit conditionality may reduce welfare competition by restricting 
unemployed workers’ access to such benefits. It is worth pointing out that 
routine workers may be concerned about the costs of benefit conditionality to 
themselves, should they become unemployed. However, the distant and low 
likelihood of automation-related unemployment materialising may render 
such concerns less salient than concerns about welfare competition. Routine 
workers may thus support benefit conditionality. 
Routine workers may also worry about status decline which may then 
influence their support for benefit conditionality. Although lower labour 
demand for routine occupations does not (yet) lead to more unemployment 
among routine workers, this decline in labour demand may nevertheless affect 
routine workers’ social standing. When demand for non-routine jobs outstrips 
demand for routine jobs, the status and value attached to routine work 
declines relative to the status of non-routine work (Kurer, 2020; see also 
Jahoda, 1982). When individuals fear status decline, they may “draw sharp 
boundaries between ‘respectable’ people like themselves and others to whom 
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less social standing can be ascribed” (Gidron and Hall, 2019, p. 8; Kuziemko 
et al., 2014), such as immigrants and unemployed workers (Ballard-Rosa et 
al., 2020; Lamont, 2000). They may differentiate themselves by drawing 
boundaries and characteristics that are in their own favour vis-à-vis the 
contrasting group (Jeene et al., 2014). Routine workers may likewise assuage 
their status anxiety by differentiating themselves from unemployed workers. 
They may try to maintain distance from unemployed workers to validate their 
own threatened position. They may do so by stressing that they work harder 
and take more responsibility for their employment than the latter (Hochschild, 
2016, p. 157; Lamont, 2000, p. 3). Such views may reinforce opinions that 
unemployed workers deserve welfare less, and increase support for stringent 
obligations on unemployment benefit recipiency (Laenen and Meuleman, 
2019; Laenen et al., 2019; van Oorschot, 2006). 
Such differences in concerns and support for benefit conditionality may 
yield electoral ramifications. A nascent literature demonstrates that 
automation affects support for radical right parties (Anelli et al., 2019; Frey et 
al., 2018; Kurer, 2020), but remains divided on the mechanism (for related see 
Engler and Weisstanner, 2020). While some studies link it to economic 
grievances (Anelli et al., 2019), others relate it to status concerns (Kurer, 
2020). Instead, I contend that automation’s effect on partisan support stems 
from both economic and status concerns. This perspective builds on recent 
approach in the political economy literature (see Engler and Weisstanner, 
2020; Gidron and Hall; 2019) which convincingly argues that pitting these two 
mechanisms as competing are misplaced: economic and status concerns may 
interact to affect partisan choice. I posit that automation-vulnerable workers 
support radical right parties because these parties assuage these workers’ 
concerns about welfare competition through their support of benefit 
conditionality. Today, radical right parties, such as the Front National and 
True Finns, frequently support stringent obligations and sanctions on benefit 
recipiency for social groups which are commonly viewed as ‘less deserving’ (De 
Koster et al., 2012; Ivaldi, 2013; Schumacher and van Kesbergen, 2014), 
namely immigrants and unemployed workers (van Oorschot, 2006). Their 
justification for such policies revolves around claims of reducing welfare 
competition for ‘more deserving’ members of society. At the same time, these 
parties also appeal to automation-vulnerable workers’ fears of status decline 
by promoting a return to the nostalgic ‘good’ old times (Gest et al., 2017). In 
short, automation-vulnerable may prefer radical right parties because such 
parties appeal to their welfare competition and status concerns, and their 
support for benefit conditionality.  
As workers face multiple sources of labour market disruptions, it is also 
worth comparing if the political consequences of automation are similar to 
those of other sources of disruption. In this dissertation, I attempt to 
benchmark the electoral impact of automation against the electoral impact of 
temporary contracts. Temporary contracts, which is frequently associated with 
worse employment security and wages, have become commonplace in 
Introduction 
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advanced capitalist economies’ highly dualised labour markets (Häusermann 
et al., 2015; Rueda, 2005). Although temporary workers have higher 
unemployment risk than permanent workers, they do not necessarily make up 
the bulk of the unemployed (Korpi and Levin, 2001). Temporary workers may 
thus resemble routine workers and provide a useful benchmark to compare 
the electoral impact of automation against the electoral impact of temporary 
contracts.  
In sum, this dissertation focuses on the political consequences of 
automation in advanced capitalist West European countries. It asks: (a) how 
does automation risk affect workers’ support for benefit conditionality, (b) 
how does automation risk affect workers’ support for party choice, (c) how 
does the partisan impact of automation risk compare to the partisan impact of 





2 THEORETICAL SECTION 
Workplace automation refers to computers and software which can replace 
human labour in the production process (Acemolgu and Restrepo, 2018; Autor 
et al, 2003). Economists consider automation as a major source of labour 
market disruptions in advanced capitalist economies (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 
2018; Goos et al., 2014; Oesch and Rodríguez, 2011). Other sources include job 
offshoring and international trade (Autor et al., 2013; Kaihovaara and Im, 
2020), the rise of temporary and part-time work (Rueda, 2005; Schwander 
and Häusermann, 2013), and the collapse of demand as evidenced by the 
COVID-19 outbreak (Forsythe et al., 2020). My focus on automation is 
motivated by current debates on the subject. Although a large number of 
economists believe that automation has profoundly affected the structure of 
employment in advanced capitalist economists, we know comparatively less 
about the socio-political consequences of such labour market disruption 
(Kurer and Palier, 2019), which motivates my focus on automation. In this 
theoretical section, I first review the automation literature and elaborate on 
the types of threat which automation risk presents to workers. I then discuss 
how such threats affect automation-vulnerable workers’ support for benefit 
conditionality policies and their party choice. Finally, I briefly review and 
discuss the electoral implications of risk arising from temporary contracts. 
Through this, I briefly compare the electoral consequences of automation risk 
to those from other risks like temporary contracts. 
 
2.1 AUTOMATION RISK: WHAT CONCERNS DO 
AUTOMATION-VULNERABLE WORKERS FACE? 
In this subsection, I review two branches of the automation literature. The first 
addresses existing debates on changes in employment structures to identify 
the characteristics of automation-vulnerable workers. The second reviews 
recent studies examining the employment trajectories of such workers to 
outline the type of risk(s) that they face. 
There are two dominant approaches to explain how automation has 
reshaped contemporary employment structures: skill-biased technological 
change (SBTC), and routine-biased technological change (RBTC). SBTC 
sought to explain employment pattern changes in the 1980s, whereas RBTC 
builds on SBTC to explain employment pattern changes from the late 1990s 
(Sacchi et al., 2020). Both SBTC and RBTC concur that high wage occupations, 
which tend to require higher skills, have benefitted most from automation. 
They however differ on employment pattern changes for low and medium 
wage occupations that tend to require low and medium skills respectively. 
Theoretical section 
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SBTC argues that automation is a substitute for labour performing low-skilled 
jobs, whereas RBTC posits that automation is a substitute for labour 
performing repetitive and easily codifiable (routine) tasks which tend to be 
concentrated in medium-skilled jobs (Biagi and Sebastian, 2020; Cirillo, 
2018). These different theoretical perspectives yield different predictions on 
the shape of employment pattern change. SBTC predicts that employment 
shares would grow monotonically with skill, whereas RBTC forecasts that 
employment share would grow in a polarised U-shaped manner. According to 
Cirillo (2018, p. 40), the empirical literature seems to find more evidence of 
polarisation in both Europe and US. Biagi and Sebastian’s (2020) meta-review 
affirms this view. It shows that most of the reviewed studies found evidence of 
job polarisation. However, Fernández-Macías and Hurley (2017), who used a 
different dataset and empirical strategy, challenge the traditional RBTC 
perspective by showing that routine tasks are concentrated in low-skilled 
occupations, rather than in medium-skilled ones in Europe. They also find that 
the shape and extent of employment patterns changes vary across Europe. 
They argue that such variations are attributable to differences in institutional 
context (Arntz et al., 2017), which contrasts with canonical RBTC approaches 
that abstract away the effect of automation from its institutional context (e.g. 
Goos et al., 2014).  
 
 




This debate between SBTC and RBTC affects the identification of workers 
who are vulnerable to automation.2 The SBTC approach suggests that it is low-
skilled workers, whereas the RBTC approach implies that it is workers in 
routine occupations. Fernández-Macías and Hurley’s (2017) seminal piece, 
however, allows us to fuse these two perspectives together, at least for Western 
European countries. Workers in routine occupations, which also tend to be 
low-skilled occupations, face the greatest risk of automation. However, this 
implication still begs the question: what type of risk do such workers face, and 
to what extent? Changes in employment shares alone do not fully capture the 
level and type of risk that individual workers face. The innovation and 
neoclassical approach to automation would suggest that automation risk 
manifests as unemployment risk (e.g. Frey and Osborne, 2017). Yet, evidence 
for such widespread unemployment is less extensive than one might come to 
expect (Autor, 2015). Any mechanical assumption between changes in 
employment shares and unemployment risk ignores the fact that such changes 
reflect two flows: entries and exits from occupations. Entries represent new 
workers who join these occupations, whereas exits represent current workers 
leaving these occupations. Declines in employment shares may arise from low 
entry rates as much as high exit rates. It is thus premature to conclude that 
declines in routine occupations signal a higher unemployment risk for routine 
workers. In fact, recent studies on routine workers’ employment trajectories 
in Switzerland, Germany, and Great Britain find that only a minority become 
unemployed; most remain employed in routine jobs (Kurer and Gallego, 2019; 
Kurer, 2020). They also find that routine jobs disappear gradually over 
generations through a decline in entry rates into such jobs (Cortes, 2016). In 
other words, the decline in routine occupations is attributable to a steep drop 
in entry rates rather than a large number of involuntary exits. 
Although routine workers are more vulnerable to automation than non-
routine workers, these findings throw into question the type of risk(s) that 
routine workers face from automation. The findings suggest that routine 
workers do not appear to face an imminent and widespread threat of 
unemployment, yet (Kurer and Gallego, 2019; Kurer, 2020). Rather, if 
unemployment does indeed materialise, it is likely to take place gradually and 
slowly in the distant future. Automation risk may thus manifest as a distant 
and possible unemployment threat rather than impending and certain one. 
This distant unemployment risk may activate welfare competition concerns 
among routine workers. Several studies find that individuals in vulnerable 
socioeconomic positions have concerns about welfare competition because 
they may come to rely on welfare (Golding and Middleton, 1982; Jeene et al., 
2014; Maasen and De Goede, 1989). Likewise, workers who are at risk of 
unemployment and may thus come to rely on unemployment benefits may 
 
2 The interest of this dissertation relates to automation risk based on recent 
labour market trends, not predictions of future labour market trends (contrast 
Frey and Osborne, 2017; Goos et al., 2014).  
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have similar concerns. Such concerns may also affect routine workers who face 
a distant, rather than imminent, risk of unemployment. Even if routine 
workers do not view themselves to be under imminent threat of 
unemployment, the threat of future unemployment may still render concerns 
about the future viability of unemployment benefit programmes salient, 
especially when individuals have become more concerned about the costs and 
sustainability of welfare programmes under austerity (Laenen et al., 2019). 
Automation-vulnerable routine workers may thus be concerned about welfare 
competition, even if imminent unemployment does not materialise.  
In addition, routine workers may also be exposed to social threats 
regardless of whether unemployment materialises. Gidron and Hall (2019) 
and Engler and Weisstanner (2020) both posit that labour market disruptions 
may engender both economic and social risks. Kurer (2020) argues that 
routine workers face the threat of social decline, even if they cling onto their 
routine jobs (Ballard-Rosa et al., 2020; Jahoda, 1982). When demand for non-
routine jobs outstrips demand for routine ones, the status of routine work 
declines relative to the status of non-routine work. Automation, therefore, 
“reshapes the employment structure and hence the relative importance and 
value attached to different kinds of work” (Kurer, 2020, p. 1804). As routine 
occupations slowly die out, the value of routine work also declines, leaving 
routine workers with the threat of social decline (Gidron and Hall, 2019, p. 6; 
Hochschild, 2016, p. 141). This problem may be especially acute for routine 
workers who previously found dignity through their permanent but routine 
jobs; they may agonise about the gradual decline in values attached to these 
jobs (Kurer and Palier, 2019; Kurer, 2020; for permanent jobs, see Sacchi et 
al., 2020). In short, automation-related labour market disruptions may 
engender concerns about welfare competition and status decline among 
routine workers in advanced capitalist countries. 
 
2.2 AUTOMATION RISK AND BENEFIT 
CONDITIONALITY SUPPORT 
Benefit conditionality policies have gained prevalence after the onset of 
austerity (Bengtsson et al., 2017), because such policies are advantageous to 
governments which are under pressure to contain costs. Such policies are 
cheaper than costlier, but more human capacity developing, enabling LMPs 
such as training and upskilling programmes. Figure 2, which is based on the 
dataset compiled by Knotz and Nelson (2018), compares the strictness of 
conditions and sanctions between the time periods 1990-2009 and 2010 
onwards. It shows that conditions and/or sanctions have become stricter in 
West European welfare states from 1990-2010 to 2010 and onwards. There is 
no country in the bottom left quadrant that represents easing of conditions 
and sanctions over time. Italy, Norway and Sweden are in the top left quadrant 
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that represents laxer conditions, but stricter sanctions over time. France, 
Denmark, Spain, the Netherlands and Germany are in bottom right quadrant 
that represents laxer sanctions but stricter conditions over time. Finally, most 
countries are in the top right quadrant that represents stricter conditions and 
sanctions over time. In short, governments have expanded benefit 
conditionality policies in recent times, even if such policies are less adept at 
reorienting a workforce to meet new labour demands in the age of automation 




Figure 2. Changes in strictness of conditions and sanctions between 1990-
2009 and 2010 onwards. 
Note: Changes expressed as mean strictness in period (2010 onwards) 
subtracted from period (1990-2009), expressed as a percentage of mean 
strictness in period (1990-2009). Higher positive values on x and y-axes 
indicate stricter conditions and sanctions in later period as compared to the 
past, respectively.   
 
Despite their prevalence, benefit conditionality policies are divisive among 
the public. Recent studies on determinants of public support for such policies 
show that unemployed workers significantly oppose such policies, whereas 
employed workers significantly support them (Buss, 2018; 2019; Fossati, 
2018). However, less attention has been paid to how risk affects support for 
benefit conditionality. I thus contribute to this theoretical gap through the case 
of automation. Specifically, I consider how automation risk may influence 
benefit conditionality support by manifesting concerns about welfare 
competition and status decline. 
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A useful starting point to theorise the relationship between risk and benefit 
conditionality is Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) study. The authors contend that 
individuals who face high unemployment risk tend to prefer policies that limit 
their exposure to such risks, and demand policies that dampen the costs 
arising from such risks (see Iversen and Soskice, 2001). This economic self-
interest perspective underpins the approach of some landmark political 
economy studies that consider how unemployment risk affects support for 
redistribution (Rehm, 2009; Schwander and Häusermann, 2013). For 
example, Rehm (2009) finds that workers who face greater risk of 
unemployment prefer redistribution. Likewise, Schwander and Häusermann 
(2013) posit that workers who face greater risk of unemployment and non-
permanent precarious employment also prefer redistribution. Such an 
approach may also be transposed to benefit conditionality support. 
Garritzmann et al. (2018) finds that lower income individuals significantly 
oppose benefit conditionality. The authors suggest that lower income 
individuals tend to experience a greater general risk of unemployment and 
thus face a higher likelihood of being subjected to benefit conditionality 
policies. They may oppose benefit conditionality because such policies impose 
further costs that exacerbate their already poor economic circumstance.  
Yet, this approach may have limited traction when considering how 
automation risk, which is predicted to threaten 47% of US jobs (Frey and 
Osborne, 2017) and 9% of jobs in 21 member countries of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Arntz et al., 2017), affects 
benefit conditionality support. This is because automation risk may not 
necessarily materialise as actual unemployment, at least in the short-run 
(Kurer and Gallego, 2019; Kurer, 2020). When routine workers worry less 
about imminent unemployment, they may feel a less pressing need for policies 
that dampen the effects of unemployment. This may perhaps explain why two 
recent studies found opposing results on the effects of automation risk on 
support for redistribution. Thewissen and Rueda (2017) revealed that routine 
workers supported more redistribution. By contrast, Sacchi et al. (2020) 
showed that routine workers were ambivalent on more generous and 
unconditional redistribution, but significantly preferred redistributive 
measures with strict conditions and sanctions. These different findings thus 
suggest that the conventional risk approach built on the Meltzer-Richard 
(1981) framework may have limits when exploring the impact of automation 
risk on benefit conditionality support.  
Instead, it may be more relevant to consider how other concerns and 
insecurities, spurred by automation-related labour market disruption, affect 
benefit conditionality support. As argued earlier, automation may engender 
worries about welfare competition. Although routine workers may not be 
concerned about imminent unemployment, they may still worry about distant 
unemployment especially as automation has a slow and gradual effect on 
employment (Cortes, 2016; Kurer and Palier, 2019). Routine workers may 
thus worry about competition from currently unemployed workers for scarce 
 
21 
unemployment benefits, especially when there has been heightened public 
concern about the fiscal viability of unemployment benefit programmes since 
austerity (Laenen et al., 2019). They may support benefit conditionality whose 
strict conditions and sanctions restrict currently unemployed workers’ use of 
unemployment benefits. Benefit conditionality may thus limit current welfare 
use to maintain its future sufficiency. Routine workers may hence support 
benefit conditionality to assuage their welfare competition concerns.  
Automation may also affect benefit conditionality support through status 
decline concerns. As argued earlier, automation may yield worries about status 
decline, even in the absence of actual unemployment. Research shows that 
people do care about their status: when faced with the threat of social decline, 
people may seek to “draw sharp boundaries between ‘respectable’ people like 
themselves and others to whom less social standing can be ascribed” (Gidron 
and Hall, 2019, p. 8). ‘Last place aversion’, which is the fear of falling into 
social groups viewed as having lower social status (Kuziemko et al., 2014), may 
fuel this boundary drawing. Put differently, status-anxious individuals may 
seek to distinguish themselves from lower status groups to validate themselves 
(Ballard-Rosa et al., 2020; Festinger, 1954; Lamont, 2000), and they do so by 
drawing boundaries and characteristics that are in their own favour (Jeene et 
al., 2014). 
One group, which status-anxious individuals may seek to distinguish 
themselves from, is unemployed workers (Hochschild, 2016). The public 
frequently views unemployed workers unfavourably because employment is 
often considered as a marker of individuals’ place in society (Jahoda, 1982; 
Tajfel and Turner, 1986).3 Lamont (2000) gives evidence of this boundary 
drawing: American, and to a lesser extent, French workers who belong to lower 
socioeconomic groups may seek to maintain their distance from welfare 
recipients to protect their own precarious status. These precarious workers 
judge members of other groups to be deficient in traits which they value and 
believe they possess: hard work, discipline, responsibility for one’s own 
employment circumstance (see also Hochschild, 2016).  
 In a similar vein, routine workers may seek to assuage their status anxiety 
by distinguishing themselves from social groups which are viewed 
unfavourably like immigrants (Gamez-Djokic and Waytz, 2000), and 
unemployed workers. Routine workers may differentiate themselves against 
unemployed workers by casting the latter in an unfavourable light. They may 
judge unemployed workers as lazy and lacking responsibility for their 
employment situation; such views are unfortunately already prevalent among 
the public (Laenen et al., 2019; van Oorschot, 2006). As studies on welfare 
deservingness show, such views may diminish the extent to which routine 
workers consider unemployed workers as deserving of welfare (Laenen et al., 
 
3 Based on this logic, they may also oppose immigrants. I do not discount 
this possibility, but I focus on unemployed workers. 
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2019; van Oorschot, 2006), and increase support for stringent conditions on 
unemployment benefit recipiency. 
In short, automation-led labour market disruptions may yield welfare 
competition and status decline concerns among routine workers that then 
influence their support for benefit conditionality (see Figure 3). Owing to the 
unlikelihood of imminent unemployment, concerns about exposure to the 
costs of benefit conditionality (if they become unemployed) may be 
overshadowed by worries about welfare competition and status decline. In 
contrast to the conventional Meltzer-Richard (1981) framework, I contend 
that routine workers may support, rather than oppose, benefit conditionality 
due to the specific concerns engendered by automation.   
Hypothesis 1) All things equal, as automation risk increases, 
workers’ support for benefit conditionality rises.  
 
Figure 3. Relationship between automation risk and benefit conditionality 
support (Hypothesis 1). 
 
Furthermore, I consider how contextual factors may influence the impact 
of automation risk on benefit conditionality support. Recent research shows 
that individuals respond politically when economic conditions deteriorate 
over time (Anelli et al., 2019; Ballard-Rosa et al., 2020). I distinguish here 
between current economic conditions and changes in economic conditions, 
and focus on the latter (Rooduijn and Burgoon, 2017). Studies show that 
worsening economic conditions spur a range of political responses such as 
feelings of marginalisation and status insecurity, stronger authoritarian 
values, support for radical right parties (Anelli et al., 2019; Ballard-Rosa et al., 
2020; Bromley-Davenport et al., 2018). I pay attention here to the effect on 
status insecurity and its implication for benefit conditionality support. 
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Worsening economic conditions, which may be reflected as worsening 
unemployment over time (Autor et al., 2013), spurs feelings of social status 
decline within the community. Ballard-Rosa et al. (2020) demonstrate that 
Americans living in communities suffering from worsening economic 
hardship over the long-term develop sociotropic feelings of status decline, 
even if they themselves do not suffer direct economic costs. Bromley-
Davenport et al. (2018) also show that British citizens who live in regions that 
have suffered economic decline experience feelings of marginalisation and 
exclusion. Such feelings are associated with fears of status decline (Gidron and 
Hall, 2019).  
One may thus expect worsening economic conditions to influence support 
for benefit conditionality by spurring feelings of status decline. When 
economic conditions worsen over time and individuals feel cut adrift, these 
feelings may exacerbate existing fears of status decline among routine 
workers. They may respond more strongly to the threat of social decline arising 
from automation, and draw sharper boundaries against lower-ranked social 
groups, such as unemployed workers (Lamont, 2000; Kuziemko et al., 2014). 
Deteriorating economic conditions, reflected in worsening unemployment 
rates (Autor et al., 2013), may hence intensify routine workers’ fears of status 
decline and aggravate their opposition to unemployed workers. They may then 
view unemployed workers as even less deserving of welfare, and support 
imposing stringent conditions on unemployment benefit access even more.  
Hypothesis 2) As automation risk increases, the rise in workers’ 
support for benefit conditionality is steepest in countries where 
unemployment rates have worsened most over time. 
 
2.3 AUTOMATION RISK AND PARTY CHOICE 
There appears to be mounting evidence that automation risk increases support 
for radical right parties in Western Europe. However, studies vary 
substantially in their explanations for this observation. Anelli et al. (2019) 
argue that economic hardship, political distrust and political dissatisfaction 
may influence automation-vulnerable workers’ support for such parties (see 
also Frey et al., 2018). By contrast, Kurer (2020) posits that routine workers 
who managed to cling onto their routine jobs support radical right parties 
because they fear status decline. Collectively, these findings suggest that the 
reasons for routine workers’ support for radical right parties are multifaceted. 
As Gidron and Hall (2019) contend, seeking an economic or social explanation 
for radical right support may be a false binary. It may thus be unhelpful to 
examine the political consequences of automation solely through economic or 
social lenses (see also Engler and Weisstanner, 2020). Rather, both economic 
and social concerns may fuel discontent that makes radical right parties’ 
appeal attractive. I adopt a similar approach and contend that welfare and 
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status concerns may influence routine workers’ support for radical right 
parties.   
In Mudde’s (2007) landmark study, radical right parties’ position on 
economic issues are viewed as electorally irrelevant because they are 
ambiguous and subordinate to their position on social ones. Some recent 
studies seem to echo this point in their observations of radical right parties 
today (Goerres et al., 2018; Rovny and Polk, 2019). Despite their diminished 
opposition to redistribution, these parties still consider this position as 
secondary to the one on social issues. This theoretical view is however rooted 
in a theoretical frame which conceptualises economic policies as 
redistributive. Instead, economic policies today are multifaceted and 
encompass a range of policies stretching from redistribution to human capital 
developing LMPs (Häusermann and Kriesi, 2015; Hemerijck, 2017). 
Furthermore, these policies today also cover questions about the level of 
redistribution and the beneficiaries of redistribution. The latter question has 
become salient under fiscal austerity when maintaining benefit levels for one 
group frequently comes at the expense of others (Häusermann and Kriesi, 
2015). In short, economic policies today are not just about how much, but also 
to whom. Although radical right parties may remain ambiguous on the first 
question, they typically have distinct positions on the second question. Studies 
on welfare chauvinism highlight that radical right parties have clear positions 
on this issue that differentiates them from other major parties (Goerres et al., 
2018; Schumacher and van Kesbergen, 2014). They tend to support strict 
obligations on welfare recipiency for groups that they consider undeserving of 
welfare. They may also support conditions that effectively lock them out from 
accessing welfare. Owing to their anti-immigration stance, radical right parties 
support restricting immigrants’ welfare recipiency. However, some recent 
studies observe that these parties also target the unemployed (Afonso and 
Papadopoulos, 2015; Ivaldi, 2013; Jensen, 2012). Jensen (2012), for instance, 
shows that radical right parties are more willing to cut unemployment benefits 
than pensions. Radical right parties’ welfare position on immigrants and the 
unemployed should not come as a surprise as the public frequently views these 
two groups as least deserving of welfare (van Oorschot, 2006). These parties 
often justify their support for restricting welfare access to these groups by 
alluding to threats to the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state (Iacono, 
2018). That is, maintaining current levels for ‘more deserving’ groups requires 
cutbacks from ‘less deserving’ welfare competitors.  
Routine workers may therefore favour radical right parties because these 
parties’ support for benefit conditionality and position on welfare competition 
resonate with their own. Yet, radical right parties are not the only major party 
family that targets unemployed workers. As Schumacher and van Kesbergen 
(2014) and Deeming (2015) note, centre right parties also frequently support 
imposing stringent obligations on unemployed workers’ benefit recipiency. 
Routine workers, who are concerned about welfare competition and support 
benefit conditionality, may conceivably support both parties. However, the 
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crucial distinction between these two parties lies in their appeals to nostalgia. 
Gest et al. (2017) highlight that radical right parties seek to wind back the clock 
and revert back to an earlier ‘better’ time (Gidron and Hall, 2019; Hochschild, 
2016). This narrative appeals to routine workers who are fearful of status 
decline and yearn for a time during which their occupations accorded them 
respectability, security, and status (Kurer, 2020; see also Lamont, 2000). 
Routine workers may hence support radical right parties that provide a more 
‘complete’ electoral package appealing to their support for benefit 
conditionality and fears of status decline and concerns about welfare 
competition. 
Routine workers may also be more inclined to support radical right parties 
than centre-left and radical left parties owing to the nature of automation risk 
(Gingrich, 2019). If automation results in imminent and widespread 
unemployment, routine workers may demand generous redistribution that 
may be met by centre-left and radical left parties (Kurer, 2020). However, 
most routine workers remain employed and ‘survive’. They thus do fine 
economically and are unlikely to suffer from material hardship, at least in the 
short-run. ‘Surviving’ routine workers may thus pay more attention to their 
other concerns of status decline and welfare competition. These concerns may 
be better met by radical right parties. In short, ‘surviving’ routine workers’ 
support for radical right parties may be multifaceted. It may be led by both 
welfare and status concerns, and their support for benefit conditionality.  
Hypothesis 3) Workers who face higher automation risk but little 
material hardship support radical right parties more than workers 
who face high automation risk and substantial material hardship. 
 
2.4 TEMPORARY CONTRACTS: DISSIMILAR RISKS BUT 
SIMILAR IMPACT ON PARTY CHOICE? 
As workers face various types of labour market disruptions, it may be relevant 
to compare the electoral consequences of these different disruptions.  I provide 
a brief comparison of automation and temporary employment contracts. 
Temporary contracts, which have a fixed employment duration, are prevalent 
in advanced capitalist economies today (Häusermann et al., 2015). Compared 
to workers on permanent contracts, workers on temporary contracts 
frequently have weaker employment protection, poorer employment rights 
and benefits, and poorer employment prospects (Rueda, 2005). Emmenegger 
(2009) also distinguishes between temporary and part-time workers. While 
most temporary workers would usually like to attain secure permanent 
contracts, some part-time workers may have actively chosen to downshift into 
such jobs. Put differently, part-time workers are heterogeneous and some may 




Temporary workers are a useful comparison because they are similar to 
routine workers in some aspects. Like routine workers (vis-à-vis non-routine 
workers), temporary workers face a greater threat of unemployment than 
permanent workers. Their employment contracts are fixed in duration and 
may not be renewed, and they tend to enjoy less employment protection and 
rights than permanent workers (Rueda, 2005). Overall, it is cheaper for firms 
to dismiss temporary workers than permanent ones (Rueda, 2014). Despite 
their higher unemployment risk, Korpi and Levin (2001) demonstrate that the 
stock of unemployed workers is not usually overrepresented by workers who 
had temporary contracts. Put differently, temporary workers may face higher 
unemployment risk, but this risk may not materialise as actual unemployment 
for most of them in the short-run. However, they still face a looming possibility 
of unemployment. This distant possibility of unemployment may yield 
concerns about the future sustainability of unemployment benefits. 
Temporary workers may thus have greater welfare competition concerns than 
permanent workers. In addition, temporary workers may also suffer from 
lower self-esteem and social status than permanent workers (McGann et al., 
2016). They are not at the bottom of the social ladder, but they may fear falling 
(Mayer et al., 2015). Temporary workers may hence resemble routine workers 
in their worries about welfare competition and status decline. Like routine 
workers, it is plausible that they may find radical right parties’ appeals 
attractive owing to such worries.  
By contrast, such expectations are less clear for part-time workers. Workers 
who downshifted voluntarily into part-time work may accept their 
employment insecurity. They may also accept their lower social status, if part-
time work accords less social status than permanent work. They may hence be 
less concerned about welfare competition or status decline fears. Such workers 
may find radical right parties’ appeals unattractive, and differ in their support 
for such parties from temporary and routine workers. Yet, there are also some 
part-time workers who have downshifted into such work involuntarily, and 
thus worry about welfare competition concerns and status decline. This group 
of part-time workers may resemble temporary and routine workers, and they 
may find radical right parties’ appeals attractive. In short, the heterogeneity of 
part-time workers makes it difficult to make clear expectations about their 
political responses vis-à-vis other workers.   
Hypothesis 4) Temporary workers support radical right parties 





3 EMPIRICAL SECTION 
 
3.1 DATA AND SAMPLE 
This dissertation is based on individual-level cross-sectional data from the 
European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS conducts cross-national surveys 
biennially to investigate European residents’ public opinion on a range of 
socioeconomic and political issues. It also asks respondents for their 
socioeconomic and demographic background. The ESS attempts to maximise 
cross-national comparability by ensuring that its questions, answers and 
sampling methods are similar across countries. The ESS is thus an appropriate 
dataset for this dissertation which has a cross-national focus.  
Since 2002, there have been nine ESS waves. Although most West 
European countries feature in all ESS waves, some countries are absent from 
some waves. The number and list of countries thus vary across waves. The ESS 
maintains a permanent and rotating survey module across all waves. The 
choice of ESS wave(s) for each sub-study depended on the availability of 
relevant variables across waves, especially if the relevant variables are 
contained only in specific rotating modules.4  Table 2 summarises the waves 
used for each sub-study. 
 
4 I did not utilise Wave 9 (2018) because the dataset was only available 




Table 2. Summary of ESS waves, variables and estimation strategy for each 
sub-study.5 
 
Table 3 summarises the criteria by which the sample is chosen for each 
Sub-study. It also summarises the sample in terms of country choice and 
respondents’ characteristics. 
 
5 Wording of dependent variables may be found in the sub-studies or their 









Table 2 provides an overview of the variables used in each of the sub-studies. 
Concerning the dependent variable, Sub-studies I and II operationalised 
benefit conditionality support using variables that measure respondents’ 
support for unemployment benefit cuts when unemployed workers refuse 
available jobs. Specifically, the variables measure respondents’ support for 
such cuts when unemployed workers reject jobs paying lower wages (Sub-
study II), and jobs requiring lower education qualifications than their own 
(Sub-study I). Both of these conditions are common obligations imposed by 
benefit conditionality policies (Buss, 2018; Fossati, 2018; Knotz, 2018). Sub-
study II however focuses solely on respondents’ obligations to accept jobs 
paying lower wages because it may be the most frequently encountered 
obligation by unemployed workers. When workers shift away from declining 
jobs or sectors, they may be offered jobs which pay lower wages because they 
lack work experience or tenure in those jobs, or the requisite education and 
skills for those jobs. Likewise, accepting a job requiring lower education than 
one possesses may also incur a fall in wages. In short, while Sub-study I takes 
a broader view of benefit conditionality policies, Sub-study II zooms in one 
specific but frequently encountered obligation embedded within benefit 
conditionality policies. In both sub-studies, benefit conditionality support is 
continuous.  
Sub-studies III and IV operationalised party choice through variables that 
measure respondents’ vote during the last national elections. In Sub-study III, 
the following party choices were included: radical right, radical left, centre 
right, centre left (see Rovny and Rovny, 2017). These party families are the 
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major partisan options voters encounter today in Western Europe and they 
cater to voters’ diverse economic and social values (Bornschier and Kriesi, 
2012; Häusermann and Kriesi, 2015). Non-voting was also included to 
benchmark against these partisan outcomes. Sub-study IV focused on the 
following party choices: radical right, centre right and centre left vote (see 
Rovny and Rovny, 2017). This sub-study has a secondary focus on the impact 
of welfare chauvinism on party choice. I thus restricted the dependent variable 
to votes for party families that have begun considering stringent obligations 
for immigrants’ access to welfare, but to varying extent (Schumacher and van 
Kesbergen, 2014). Party choice in Sub-studies III and IV is categorical.  
Concerning the explanatory variables, Sub-studies I, II and III 
operationalised automation risk using two indicators. Sub-studies I and II 
operationalised automation risk using the Routine Task Intensity (RTI) index. 
RTI is widely used to measure automation risk (e.g. Sacchi et al., 2020; 
Thewissen and Rueda, 2017). I used RTI supplied by Owen and Johnston’s 
(2017) study that assigned RTI values to occupations categorised at the ISCO-
88 four-digit level. An individual workers’ automation risk therefore reflects 
her occupation’s vulnerability to automation. The authors based their 
operationalisation of RTI on Acemoglu and Autor’s (2011) calculations for 
different occupations in the United States (US). They computed RTI by 
subtracting the natural log of routine tasks from the sum of the natural log of 
abstract and manual tasks (Goos et al., 2014). RTI values are considered to be 
country invariant (Thewissen and Rueda, 2017). Even if these values were 
based on US data, Biagi and Sebastian (2020) show that studies using RTI 
yield findings about the shape of changes in European labour markets that are 
similar to those from other studies using other indices based on other data 
sources. Higher values indicate that occupations contain more routine tasks, 
which may imply that workers in such occupations face greater automation 
threat. 
Sub-study III operationalised automation risk based on Arntz et al.’s (2017) 
calculations. They computed workers’ automation risk by calculating the share 
of workers who may be vulnerable to automation within an occupation based 
on cross-national data from the Programme for the International Assessment 
of Adult Competencies (PIAAC). Automation risk values were assigned at the 
ISCO-08 2-digit level.6 The Arntz et al. index thus differs from the RTI index 
in its conceptualisation and measurement. Unlike the US-based RTI that 
measures the extent to which an occupation consists of routine tasks, the 
cross-nationally calculated Arntz et al. index measures the share of workers 
who may become unemployed from automation within an occupation. Despite 
differences in conceptualisation and calculation, these two indices are strongly 
correlated (Pearson’s correlation = 0.68). Higher values on this index indicate 
that occupations contain a larger share of workers at risk of becoming 
 




unemployed from automation, and thus imply that workers in such 
occupations face a greater threat from automation. 
To assess the contextual effect of worsening economic hardship in Sub-
study II, I operationalised it as the average year-on-year change in countries’ 
unemployment rates over a ten-year period (2006 to 2016). Year-on-year 
changes provide a better account of the extent of economic hardship over time 
than snapshot views offered by current unemployment rates.  
Sub-study II assesses the conditional impact of perceived material 
hardship on automation risk’s effect on electoral behaviour. I operationalised 
perceived material hardship as respondents’ views on their current income 
security. It is categorical: (1) living comfortably, (2) coping, (3) finding it 
difficult, or (4) finding it very difficult on present income. 
I followed Emmenegger’s (2009) classification of workers’ employment 
contracts in Sub-study IV. It distinguishes between upscales, permanent, 
temporary, part-time, and unemployed workers. Upscales are workers who are 
in “privileged positions in the labour market” (p. 133) and need not worry 
about unemployment. They are employees belonging to the European Socio-
economic Classification (ESeC) category 1: large employers, higher managers 
and professionals with permanent contracts. Workers on permanent contracts 
are workers who do not have fixed term or part-time contracts, and are 
employees drawn from all other ESeC categories. Temporary workers are 
employees on fixed term contracts, and part-time workers are employees 
working for less than 30 hours a week (Rovny and Rovny, 2017). I also 
included a category which captures all non-labour market participants to 
compare results of labour market participants with non-labour market 
participants. 
Finally, I included individual-level controls that may confound the effect of 
the explanatory variables (see Table 2). In all sub-studies, I included controls 
that are frequently used in similar studies (e.g. Rovny and Rovny, 2017; 
Thewissen and Rueda, 2017). These controls typically include individuals’ 
sociodemographic traits such age and gender and their political attitudes 
(Fossati, 2018). They also consist of household-related traits such as marital 




The choice of method depends on the nature of the dependent variable and the 
focus of the sub-studies (see Table 2). In Sub-study I, I focused on the 
individual (worker) level and estimated the effect of automation risk by 
applying ordinary least squares (OLS) to a pooled model with country fixed 
effects. Single-level pooled models are appropriate when a researcher is 
interested in the effects of individual-level determinants (Bryan and Jenkins, 
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2015; McNeish and Kelley, 2016).7 Country idiosyncrasies are purged by 
including country dummies. It is necessary to control for country 
idiosyncrasies because they may differ in their rate of adoption of automation 
(Acemolgu and Restrepo, 2018), have different labour market and social policy 
regimes which dampen or worsen unemployment risk from automation 
(Fernández-Macías and Hurley, 2017). These country-level differences may 
influence the effects of automation risk. Country dummies absorb such 
country confounders, and so “researchers need not be concerned with 
including level-2 [country] predictors in the model, because variance 
attributable to all Level 2 variables (whether available in the data or not) is 
consumed by the cluster affiliation variables” (McNeish and Kelley, 2019, p. 
23). Furthermore, McNeish and Stapleton (2016) and McNeish and Kelley 
(2019) recommend using fixed effect models when there are few level 2 cases, 
as in Sub-study I.  
In Sub-study II, I focused on how contextual factors may influence the 
effect of automation risk on benefit conditionality. With more level-2 (country) 
cases, I used multilevel models with random country intercepts and cross-level 
interactions to estimate the contextual effect of changes in unemployment 
rates on the association between automation risk and benefit conditionality. 
Individuals are thus nested within their countries. A fixed-effects model with 
a pooled sample would be less appropriate here: country dummies preclude 
the inclusion of other country-level predictors, because they absorb all 
country-level variance. Alternatively, one may turn to a single-level pooled 
model that excludes country dummies but includes country-level predictors. 
Yet, omitting country dummies to include country-level predictors also means 
that one risks omitting relevant country-level variables that may affect the 
results. Multilevel models diminish these concerns, and are thus preferred for 
Sub-study II. The multilevel models were estimated using OLS.  
In Sub-study III, I applied multinomial logit regression estimation with 
country and year fixed effects. In this sub-study, I focused on individual-level 
effects, which made a single-level pooled model with country and year fixed 
effects appropriate, especially when there were insufficient country cases to 
estimate a multilevel model. Country and year dummies absorb country and 
year-related idiosyncrasies. Multinomial logit models are appropriate when 
the dependent variable is categorical and it contains all expectedly possible 
outcomes (Dow and Endersby, 2004). If this independence of irrelevant 
alternatives axiom (IIA) were unmet, multinomial probit models would have 
been more appropriate.8 The dependent variable in Sub-study III arguably 
contained all expectedly possible voting outcomes, both in terms of voting and 
 
7 See appendix in Bryan and Jenkins (2015).  
8 Multinomial probit models are also afflicted by problems, as specified in 
Dow and Endersby (2004), which multinomial logit models suffer less from. I 




non-voting as well as choice of party families. I thus opted for a multinomial 
logit estimation strategy.  
In Sub-study IV, I applied multinomial probit regression estimation with 
country and year fixed effects. As I only included a subset of possible voting 
outcomes, a multinomial logit estimation model would violate the IIA axiom. 
A multinomial probit estimation model was thus preferred. Likewise, a single-
level pooled model with country and year dummies was appropriate because 
there were insufficient country cases to estimate a multilevel model. 
 






4.1 ROUTINE WORKERS’ SUPPORT FOR BENEFIT 
CONDITIONALITY 
I first present an overview of how workers’ automation risk is stratified by their 
occupations. Table 4 presents the mean and standard deviation values of 
automation risk for different occupations. I classified occupations here at their 
aggregated ISCO-88 1-digit level for ease of comparison. According to the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO), the ISCO-88 system also 
differentiates occupations by their required skill level. Skill level refers to the 
degree of specialisation and the complexity of tasks performed in an 
occupation. The rightmost column shows the skill level requirements for each 
occupational category as assigned by ILO. Higher values indicate greater 
complexity and specialisation. Occupations with higher skill levels frequently 
also require higher levels of education.  
Table 4 shows that workers in plant and machine operating and assembly, 
craft and related trade work, clerical, and elementary occupations experience 
the highest automation risk in descending order. By contrast, legislators, 
senior officials, and managers and professionals have the lowest automation 
risk. Table 4 also demonstrates that workers in occupations that require 
middling skill levels (level 2) experience the highest automation risk. Plant and 
machine operators and assemblers, craft related trade workers, and clerks who 
require middling skills face higher automation risk than elementary workers 
who require low skills (level 1). Automation risk thus appears to be 
concentrated among workers in medium-skilled occupations (RBTC) rather 
than workers in low-skilled ones (SBTC). It is however important to highlight 
that workers’ automation risk varies substantially within these broad ISCO-88 
1-digit occupational categories. This is because automation risk was assigned 




Table 4. Mean and standard deviation values of automation risk and skill 
level requirements for occupations classified at the ISCO-88 1-digit level. 
 
After showing which workers are in routine occupations and are thus 
threatened by automation, I present results on the impact of automation risk 
on benefit conditionality support. Table 5 shows results from stepwise 
regressions performed in Sub-study I. In these stepwise regressions, I included 
covariate(s) incrementally in each model to assess changes in the effect of 
automation risk on benefit conditionality support. In Model 1, automation risk 
has a positive and significant (p <0.001) impact on benefit conditionality 
support. That is, workers who face a greater threat of automation support 
benefit conditionality more.  
Model 2 considers if this relationship is sensitive to the inclusion of 
education. Education may confound the impact of automation risk on benefit 
conditionality in two ways. Firstly, the effect of automation risk may be driven 
by education, if it is concentrated among lower-educated workers as argued by 
the SBTC hypothesis (Katz and Murphy, 1992) and by Fernández-Macías and 
Hurley (2017). Secondly, if automation risk is indeed concentrated among 
lower-educated workers, then the observed effect of automation risk may in 
fact be led by the effect of authoritarian political attitudes. This is because 
lower-educated workers are more likely to have authoritarian political 
attitudes (Dekker and Ester, 1989), which may then make them more inclined 
to support restrictive welfare policies such as benefit conditionality 
(Achterberg et al., 2014; Häusermann and Kriesi, 2015). In short, education 
may have direct and indirect effects on benefit conditionality support, and 
these effects may be correlated with the effects of automation risk. Based on 
the descriptive statistics presented in Table 4, it seems that automation risk is 
neither concentrated nor limited to lower-educated workers: education does 
not have a monotonical relationship with automation risk. Nevertheless, it is 
worth testing the potential confounding effect of education more thoroughly 
(Model 2). The results show that automation risk remains robust after purging 
the effects of educational differences. However, decreases in automation risk’s 
effect magnitude and level of significance (p <0.01) suggest that some of its 
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correlation with benefit conditionality support, as observed in Model 1, was 
driven by educational differences. 
Models 3 and 4 further assess if the relationship between automation risk 
and benefit conditionality support is sensitive to respondents’ political 
ideology (Fossati, 2018), and their political attitudes (Achterberg et al., 2014; 
Häusermann and Kriesi, 2015). It is useful to control for respondents’ political 
ideology and attitudes as they may represent the indirect effect of education 
on benefit conditionality support. Unsurprisingly, individuals who have right-
wing ideology and authoritarian attitudes (oppose immigration) support 
benefit conditionality significantly more. Nevertheless, automation risk 
remains robust even after purging these effects. However, decreases in 
automation risk’s effect magnitude and level of significance (p <0.01) suggest 
that some of its correlation with benefit conditionality support, as observed in 
Model 1, was driven by political ideology and political attitudes.  
 
 
Table 5. Stepwise regression results on the relationship between automation 
risk and demanding ALMP support (extracted from Sub-study I).  
 
Figure 4 illustrates linear predictions of benefit conditionality support at 
different levels of automation risk. Calculations are based on Model 2, which 
purges the effects of education. The dependent variable, benefit conditionality 
support, ranges from -1.37 to 1.52. The dependent variable has a value of -0.30 
at the minimum value of automation risk and a value of 0.32 at its maximum 
value. When translated to percentage points, a rise in automation risk from its 
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minimum to maximum values yields a 20.8 points increase in support for 
benefit conditionality, which is sizable.  
Figure 4 also illustrates that workers are stratified in their support for 
benefit conditionality at the poles of automation risk. Workers who experience 
low/high automation threat significantly oppose/support benefit 
conditionality policies. By contrast, workers who experience only middling 
automation threat are neither significantly predisposed nor opposed to such 
policies. Presumably, they do neither because they experience a threat that is 
greater than low-risk workers, but one that falls short of that faced by high-
risk workers. Put differently, this middling level of threat may be adequate to 
prompt these workers to feel some concerns about welfare competition or 
status decline such that they would not oppose benefit conditionality. 
However, the level of threat, and hence the corresponding degree of welfare 
competition and status concerns, may not be sufficient to prompt these 
workers to support benefit conditionality. In short, automation-threatened 
routine workers support benefit conditionality, whereas automation-secure 
non-routine workers oppose benefit conditionality.  
 
 
Figure 4. Linear predictions of benefit conditionality support at different 
levels of automation risk.  
 
Having examined individual-level effects of automation risk, Figure 5 
explores the contextual effect of worsening economic hardship. It highlights 
that the effect of automation risk is contingent on the extent to which 
economic hardship has worsened. When unemployment rates have worsened 
over time like in Spain, Italy, and Ireland, automation risk yields a 
considerable increase in support for benefit conditionality. By contrast, when 
unemployment rates have diminished over time like in Israel, Poland, and 
results 
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Germany, automation risk yields a considerable decrease in support for benefit 
conditionality. Based on each countries’ standard deviation for support for 
benefit conditionality, the difference between the maximum and minimum 
values of automation risk translates to a rise in support of 42.4 and 28.1 
percentage points in Spain and Italy, and a fall in support of 33.9, and 31.5 
percentage points in Poland and Germany. The impact of automation risk on 
benefit conditionality support is thus substantial in countries with worsening 
or declining unemployment rates over time. These results are robust to 
different operationalisations of this contextual variable.9 In sum, routine 
workers support benefit conditionality when economic hardship worsens. 




Figure 5. Predicted support for benefit conditionality at minimum and 
maximum automation risk values. Countries ranked by average year-on-
year change in unemployment rates from 2006 to 2016 in descending order 
(from growth to decline in unemployment rates) (extracted from Sub-study 
II). 
 
4.2 ROUTINE WORKERS’ SUPPORT FOR RADICAL 
RIGHT PARTIES 
The subsection above shows that automation risk affects support for public 
and social policies. These findings may beg the question: does automation risk 
 
9 See subsection “Robustness Checks” (Sub-study II).  
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also affect electoral behaviour? Table 6 presents multinomial logit estimates 
of the effects of automation risk and perceived material hardship on electoral 
behaviour. The estimates compare the likelihood of one outcome occurring 
vis-à-vis the base outcome that is radical right vote. With respect to party 
choice alone, Table 6 highlights that a rise in automation risk significantly 
decreases support for radical left, centre left, and centre right parties vis-à-vis 
radical right parties. With respect to the decision to vote, automation risk does 
not significantly affect respondents’ likelihood of not voting over choosing 
radical right parties. Perceived material hardship also significantly affects 
respondents’ preference for centre left and centre right parties over radical 
right ones. Respondents who are coping or living comfortably on present 
income prefer centre left and centre right parties over radical right ones more 
than respondents who are finding it difficult on present income. 
In short, the direct effects of automation risk relate to party choice rather 
than the decision to (not) vote. Although workers who face automation threat 
are more likely to support radical right parties than other parties, they may 
also choose not to vote. It is thus necessary to identify conditions under which 
automation-threatened workers may vote for radical right parties, and 
conditions under which they may abstain from voting.  
 
 
Table 6. Multinomial logit regression estimates on electoral behaviour 
(extracted from Sub-study III) 
 
Figure 6 explores one such condition. It illustrates the average marginal 
effect of a unit change of automation risk on electoral behaviour conditional 
on different levels of perceived material hardship. Figure 6 shows that 
automation risk does not have a significant association with radical right vote 
when respondents feel substantial material hardship (finding it difficult or 
very difficult). Automation risk is, however, positively and significantly 
associated with radical right support when respondents feel little material 
hardship (coping and feeling comfortable). In fact, a rise in automation risk 
yields a greater rise in radical right support among workers who feel some 
results 
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material hardship (coping) than workers who feel no hardship (feeling 
comfortable). It is thus clear that not all workers who are threatened by 
automation prefer radical right parties. Voters who feel substantial material 
hardship would abstain rather than vote for radical right parties. 
Nevertheless, it is still not possible to distinguish conditions under which 
automation-vulnerable workers would conclusively vote for radical right 
parties rather than abstain based on these results. The effect of automation 
risk on non-voting is still relatively larger than the effect of automation risk on 
radical right vote among workers who feel little or no material hardship. To 
recap, these results suggest that automation risk has a clear impact on party 
choice: workers who are threatened by automation and feel little material 
hardship support radical right parties significantly more than other parties. 
Automation risk, however, does not have as distinguishable an impact on the 
choice to (not) vote. It seems that automation-threatened workers who feel 
little material hardship are as inclined to vote for radical right parties as they 
would not vote. 
 
 
Figure 6. Effect of automation risk on electoral behaviour probability, 
conditional on perceived material hardship (extracted from Sub-study III). 
 
4.3 COMPARING ROUTINE AND TEMPORARY 
WORKERS 
Next, I explore if temporary contracts yield similar electoral outcomes as 
automation risk. Model 1 in Table 7 presents the direct effect of employment 
contracts on party choice. It shows multinomial probit estimates that compare 
the likelihood of voting for centre left and centre right parties vis-à-vis radical 
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right parties. In comparison to upscale workers who face the lowest risk, all 
other categories of workers and non-workers are significantly less to vote for 
centre left and centre right parties than radical right ones. At first glance, these 
results may suggest that there is little tangible difference in the party choice of 
workers on different employment contracts.  
However, workers on different employment contracts may be 
heterogeneous, and this heterogeneity may mask any distinguishability in 
their party choice. One potential heterogeneity relates to their policy opinions. 
Existing studies show that support for stringent obligations on immigrants’ 
recipiency of welfare benefits, namely welfare chauvinism, may increase 
support for radical right parties (Bornschier and Kriesi, 2012; Goerres et al., 
2018).10  Table 7 shows a similar result: respondents who have welfare 
chauvinist views support centre left and centre right parties significantly less 
than radical right ones. If workers with different employment contracts are 
heterogeneous, they may only have clear and distinguishable party choices 
once the conditional effects of their policy opinions is taken into account. 
Model 2 reflects this point: the direct effects of employment contracts and 
welfare chauvinist opinions are no longer significant after including their 
corresponding interaction terms.  
 
10 Stringent obligations against immigrants’ benefit recipiency may be 





Table 7. Multinomial probit regression estimates on party choice (extracted 
from Sub-study IV). 
 
As multinomial probit regression estimates of interaction terms are 
challenging to interpret, Figure 7 illustrates them as predicted probabilities. It 
shows that workers with different employment contracts have distinguishable 
party choice conditional on their support for stringent obligations on 
immigrants’ recipiency of welfare benefits. Temporary workers who support 
welfare chauvinism differ from other similar employed workers (upscale, 
permanent, part-time) in their support for centre left and radical right parties. 
They are least supportive of centre left parties and most supportive of radical 
right parties in comparison to all other employed workers. They also have a 
higher probability of supporting radical right parties than unemployed 
workers and non-employed respondents with similarly high levels of support 
for welfare chauvinism. Likewise, they have a lower probability of supporting 
centre left parties than unemployed workers and non-employed respondents 
with similarly high levels of support for welfare chauvinism. Concerning centre 
right parties, temporary workers are generally indistinct from workers with 
other employment contracts. Figure 7 thus suggests that temporary workers 
are split between radical right and centre left parties based on their support 
for welfare chauvinism. They favour centre left parties when they oppose 
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welfare chauvinist policies, but prefer radical right parties when they support 
such policies.  
In short, temporary workers who may face more labour market risk than 
upscale, permanent and part-time workers have clear and distinct party 
preferences once their policy opinions are taken into account. There is thus 
evidence that workers’ party choice is stratified by their employment 
contracts. In short, employment contracts are similar to workplace 




Figure 7. Predicted probabilities of party choice for workers of different 
employment status and contracts conditional on their level of support for 
benefit conditionality policies imposed on immigrants (welfare chauvinism) 






Table 8 summarises the main findings of each sub-study contained in this 
dissertation and they are discussed further below. 
 
Table 8. Summary of research questions, findings, contributions, and areas 
for further research. 
 
5.1 RISK AS A DETERMINANT OF BENEFIT 
CONDITIONALITY SUPPORT 
The growing literature on determinants of public support for benefit 
conditionality has shown that current employment status significantly 
influences such support (Buss, 2018; 2019; Fossati, 2018). We however know 
less about how unemployment risk affects such support. With the exception of 
two studies which examined this factor briefly (Buss, 2018; Garritzmann et al., 
2018), most do not focus explicitly on this factor. Some studies also do not 
distinguish between the impact of unemployment risk and the impact of 
unemployment status (e.g. Fossati, 2018), which is an approach some studies 
have cautioned against (Rovny and Rovny, 2017). This is because actual 
unemployment and the threat of unemployment may manifest different 
concerns, which then yield varying political outcomes. This dissertation’s 
study of automation risk may thus be viewed as a contribution to the current 




Although the Meltzer and Richard (1981) framework, which argues that 
individuals support policies that minimise their economic risk (see also 
Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Rehm, 2009), may be a useful starting point to 
theorise how risk affects support for social policies, it may be less useful in the 
case of automation. Automation risk may be unlike other types of labour 
market risks because automation-threatened routine workers generally cling 
onto their jobs; only a minority become unemployed (Kurer and Gallego, 2019; 
Kurer, 2020). In other words, automation risk may not entail imminent or 
substantial unemployment. Automation risk therefore does not appear to 
resemble a typical unemployment risk: workers who face high unemployment 
risk typically experience a high likelihood of becoming imminently 
unemployed (see also Kurer and Palier, 2019). To understand how automation 
risk affects benefit conditionality support, it is perhaps more useful to 
deliberate on the type and nature of threat that routine workers encounter 
from automation risk. I posit that it may manifest both welfare competition 
and status decline concerns, even in the absence of imminent unemployment 
(Kurer, 2020; Laenen et al., 2019). Such concerns may then increase support 
for benefit conditionality support, as expressed in Hypothesis 1: all things 
equal, as automation risk increases, workers’ support for benefit conditionality 
rises.  
Results from both Sub-studies I and II show that Hypothesis 1 cannot be 
rejected. They demonstrate that automation risk significantly increases 
support for benefit conditionality. In other words, routine workers may 
support benefit conditionality because they worry about welfare competition 
and status decline. That is, however, not to say that routine workers do not fret 
about having to bear the costs of benefit conditionality, should they become 
unemployed (see for related Jeene et al., 2013). However, the low likelihood of 
imminent unemployment from automation may mean that such worries are 
relegated behind other concerns such as welfare competition and status 
decline. When concerns about welfare competition and status decline are more 
salient on balance, routine workers may support benefit conditionality policies 
rather than oppose them. Separately, Sub-study II finds that currently 
employed and unemployed workers significantly differ in their support for 
benefit conditionality. These findings are consistent with results from other 
similar studies (Buss, 2018; Fossati, 2018). Collectively, these results reflect 
the need to disentangle the impact of risk from the impact of current 
employment status (Rovny and Rovny, 2017). 
Crucially, the impact of automation risk is robust despite purging the 
effects of education and authoritarian political values that may confound the 
relationship between automation risk and benefit conditionality support. If 
the SBTC approach is correct, lower-educated workers have a higher likelihood 
of being in occupations that are vulnerable to automation (Arntz et al., 2017; 
Fernández-Macías and Hurley, 2017; Katz and Murphy, 1992). Lower-
educated workers, owing to their higher propensity for authoritarian political 
values, may have a higher likelihood of supporting stringent welfare 
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obligations and thus benefit conditionality (Achterberg et al., 2014; 
Häusermann and Kriesi, 2015). The robustness of this result therefore 
indicates that the association between automation risk and benefit 
conditionality support is not led by differences in education or authoritarian 
political values. 
The findings in Sub-studies I and II are also supported by results from 
Sacchi et al.’s (2020) study on Italy. The authors investigated how automation 
risk affected Italian workers’ support for two benefit systems: an 
unconditional unemployment benefit system, and a conditional one that 
imposes stringent activation requirements. They find that routine workers are 
not significantly predisposed towards unconditional and generous 
unemployment benefits. Instead, they significantly support conditional 
unemployment benefits with stringent obligations. Sacchi et al.’s (2020) 
findings echo results from Sub-studies I and II. The authors however provided 
different justifications for their findings. They argued that routine workers in 
Italy are typically employed on privileged permanent contracts (Emmenegger, 
2010; Rueda, 2005). Such workers may hence support conditional 
unemployment benefit systems because they are the prime beneficiaries of 
such systems through their steady social security contributions. This 
explanation is however consistent with explanations presented here. Routine 
workers, especially if they are labour market insiders, may feel especially 
concerned about welfare competition and status decline concerns arising from 
automation. This is because their routine jobs and permanent contracts used 
to accord them welfare and status security. That is, they enjoyed good social 
protection and social security privileges and had a valued social status. 
Automation, however, undermines such privileges and security. Routine 
workers, despite their permanent contracts, may become unemployed in the 
distant future during which the generosity of unemployment benefits may 
have eroded away due to austerity. They also face the threat of status decline 
as labour demand for such jobs fall. Routine workers, who had enjoyed the 
privileged of having permanent contracts, may hence manifest even greater 
worries about welfare competition and status decline, which then spur them 
to support benefit conditionality policies.  
Yet, changes in the level of economic hardship experienced by communities 
may also influence the impact of automation risk. Even if individuals do not 
experience greater economic risk themselves, they may become more fearful 
of status decline when there is substantial economic hardship (Ballard-Rosa 
et al., 2020; Bromley-Davenport et al., 2018). I thus expected worsening 
economic condition to influence how automation risk affects public support 
for benefit conditionality as expressed in Hypothesis 2: as automation risk 
increases, the rise in workers’ support for benefit conditionality is steepest in 
countries where unemployment rates have worsened most over time. 
Results from Sub-study II show that Hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected. The 
results show that the difference in benefit conditionality support between 
routine and non-routine workers is greatest in countries whose 
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unemployment rates have worsened or ameliorated most. Specifically, routine 
workers support benefit conditionality substantially more than non-routine 
workers when there is worsening economic hardship. These findings appear 
consistent with those from recent findings about the political consequences of 
extended economic hardship. Worsening economic hardship engenders 
feelings of marginalisation and status concerns which then drive political 
responses such as opposition to immigration and minorities, anti-elite 
sentiments, support for radical right parties (Anelli et al., 2019; Ballard-Rosa 
et al., 2020; Bromley-Davenport et al., 2018), and support for benefit 
conditionality. This finding may help explain why individuals in economically 
decaying areas paradoxically support harsh welfare policies like benefit 
conditionality that may not be in their interest (Hochschild. 2016). I contend 
that their status concerns motivate such support.  
However, the results also show that routine workers oppose benefit 
conditionality when there is a substantial fall in unemployment rates. When 
there is less economic hardship, routine workers may feel less threatened by 
status decline, and become less predisposed to judge unemployed workers 
harshly. They may even sympathise with unemployed workers during better 
economic conditions, and thus oppose benefit conditionality. In short, 
worsening economic hardship may create fertile conditions that allow worries 
about status decline and welfare competition to manifest from automation 
risk. Routine workers may thus support benefit conditionality especially 
during times of economic duress.11  
Overall, these findings from the case of automation suggest that risk is an 
important determinant of benefit conditionality support. In addition, the 
impact of automation risk varies across contexts. Whereas high levels of 
unemployment prompts automation-threatened workers’ solidarity with 
unemployed workers (Uunk and van Oorschot, 2019) and may thus decrease 
their support for benefit conditionality policies, worsening unemployment 
over time increases their status decline fears and hence their support for such 
policies. It is also worth reiterating the relevance of disentangling the impact 
of risk from the impact of employment status. In the case of automation, 
vulnerable routine workers do not respond like unemployed workers. The 
results also demonstrate how risk may manifest multiple concerns that may 
not relate directly to a worker’s pocketbook, but are nevertheless politically 
consequential. In short, it is useful to distinguish both employed and 
unemployed workers, and vulnerable and non-vulnerable employed workers 
when examining determinants of public support for benefit conditionality.  
 
 
11 This finding is not sensitive to various alternate operationalisations of 
changes in unemployment rates. See Sub-study II. 
discussion 
48 
5.2 AUTOMATION RISK AND PARTY CHOICE: 
MULTIFACETED REASONS FOR SUPPORTING 
RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES 
There is mounting evidence that automation risk has electoral implications, 
especially for radical right support. Most of these studies study its impact at 
the regional level (Anelli et al., 2019; Frey et al. 2018). The few that focus on 
the individual level argue that automation-threatened workers’ support for 
radical right parties may be traced to their worries about status decline (Kurer 
and Gallego, 2019; Kurer, 2020). Such worries may increase the attractiveness 
of radical right parties’ appeals to nostalgia (Gest et al., 2017). As most 
automation-threatened workers do not experience economic deprivation from 
unemployment, these studies generally discount welfare reasons as 
explanations for these workers’ preference for radical right parties. Kurer 
(2020) noted, “‘more welfare’ in the traditional sense might not help alleviate 
grievances (p. 1826; see also Gingrich, 2019). Yet, this perspective ignores how 
welfare considerations have expanded beyond ‘more’ or ‘less’ welfare, and now 
includes considerations about ‘who ought to get what’ (Häusermann and 
Kriesi, 2015). In other words, welfare concerns today are about distributive 
deservingness as well as distributive levels.  
Radical right parties seem to have recognised this evolution in the welfare 
debate, since they have formulated distinct positions on welfare issues 
regarding the deservingness of immigrants and unemployed workers, and 
consequently the obligations that such groups ought to be subjected to when 
they receive benefits (Goerres et al., 2018; Ivaldi, 2013; Schumacher and van 
Kesbergen, 2014). Radical right parties’ position on such issues may appeal to 
automation-threatened routine workers’ support for benefit conditionality 
policies, since most of these workers may not face imminent unemployment 
(Kurer, 2020; Kurer and Gallego, 2019) and are thus at low risk of being 
subjected to such stringent obligations. In other words, automation-
threatened workers’ support for radical right parties may be multifaceted. 
Given radical right parties’ position on such welfare issues, it is not possible to 
preclude that welfare considerations complement status concerns to influence 
these workers’ support for such parties. I thus expected workers who face 
higher automation risk but little material hardship to support radical right 
parties more than workers who face high automation risk and substantial 
material hardship (Hypothesis 3). 
Results from Sub-study III suggest that Hypothesis 3 cannot be rejected. 
Only automation-threatened workers who are living comfortably or coping 
materially are significantly more likely to support radical right parties than 
other parties. The same cannot be said for automation-threatened workers 
who are finding it difficult or very difficult materially. These findings are 
consistent with status-based explanations of automation’s effect on party 
choice: automation-threatened workers who suffer material hardship may pay 
more attention to their economic vulnerability than their status decline 
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(Kurer, 2020). They may prefer leftist parties’ support for generous 
redistributive programmes that compensate for their economic weakness than 
radical right parties’ ambiguity on such programmes (Rovny and Polk, 2019). 
These findings are also consistent with welfare-based explanations: workers 
who experience material hardship may oppose stringent obligations for 
benefit recipiency because they may be subjected to them. They may thus not 
find radical right parties’ harsh views on welfare deservingness and their 
support for stringent obligations appealing. By contrast, workers who are 
threatened by automation but are living comfortable or coping materially may 
be less concerned about the burden of such obligations. They may thus find 
radical right parties’ support for harsh views on welfare deservingness and 
appeals to nostalgia attractive. Furthermore, and building on results from 
Sub-study II, the level of economic hardship may affect these workers’ support 
for radical right parties. These workers may find radical right parties’ appeals 
even more attractive when economic hardship worsens. In short, both welfare 
and status concerns are compatible and complementary explanations for why 
automation risk increases support for radical right parties over other party 
families. 
Yet, neither explanation fares well in distinguishing when automation risk 
increases the likelihood of voting for radical right parties over not voting. 
Kurer (2020) finds that automation-threatened workers who survive vote for 
radical right parties and automation-threatened workers who become 
unemployed do not vote. Sub-study III however shows that automation-
vulnerable workers who face little material hardship, and are thus arguably 
‘survivors’, are torn between voting for radical right parties and not voting. 
These seemingly contrasting findings here highlight two considerations. 
Firstly, the decision mechanisms behind voting and party choice may be 
driven by different concerns. While party choice may be influenced by voters’ 
support for parties’ policy and issue positions, the decision to vote may be led 
by other factors like the lack of economic and psychological resources. This 
point is highlighted in studies that explore determinants of voter turnout 
(Aytaç et al., 2018). The explanations offered in the political science literature 
on automation and here are however rooted in how voters’ policy and issue 
preferences are met by political parties. It is perhaps less equipped to 
disentangle non-preference related factors that may determine automation-
vulnerable workers’ decision to vote for radical right parties or not vote.  
Secondly, it is not a foregone conclusion that automation-threatened 
workers favour only radical right parties. Although this dissertation and recent 
research stress that individuals who worry about welfare competition and 
status decline tend to support radical right parties (Engler and Weisstanner, 
2020; Gidron and Hall, 2019; Goerres et al., 2019; Hochschild, 2016), 
heterogeneity among these individuals means that some of them may have 
divergent partisan preferences. Likewise, some automation-threatened 
workers may therefore find resonance with radical right appeals, whereas 
others may find little allure in these appeals owing to differences in political 
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values, political and social experiences (Campbell et al., 1960). For instance, 
some automation-threatened workers may have liberal values and find radical 
right parties’ authoritarian solutions grating. These workers may also find 
other parties’ solutions unappealing and thus abstain from voting. This 
explanation of Sub-study III’s findings, that is automation-threatened workers 
may support radical right parties or not vote, is more consistent with a 
perspective that emphasises the relevance of policy and issue preferences to 
voting behaviour. Additionally, this split means that a reservoir of automation-
threatened voters, who have yet been politically mobilised, exists. Political 
entrepreneurs and parties may eventually seek to mobilise this group of voters 
by appealing to the specific demands of this group of voters. This study thus 
contributes to existing debates on the individual-level effects of automation 
and highlights the need to disaggregate automation-threatened ‘survivors’, 
and identify if these different groups have varying political demands. 
 
5.3 TEMPORARY CONTRACTS: DISSIMILAR RISKS, 
SIMILAR PARTY CHOICE? 
Given the specific characteristics of automation risk, it begs the question of 
whether risks from other sources yield similar political outcomes. Results from 
Sub-study IV offer a comparison of two risks, namely automation and 
temporary contracts. Although routine and temporary workers are more 
vulnerable than non-routine and permanent workers respectively, they may 
nevertheless not be under immediate or substantial threat of unemployment 
(Korpi and Levin, 2001; Kurer, 2020). This similarity may yield similar 
concerns for both groups, which may then influence their party choice. Like 
routine workers, I thus anticipated that temporary workers support radical 
right parties more than permanent workers (Hypothesis 4).  
Results from Sub-study IV show that temporary workers differ significantly 
in their support for radical right parties from workers on other types of 
employment contracts, after accounting for their welfare chauvinist attitudes. 
Hypothesis 4 hence cannot be rejected. The conditional effect of workers’ 
support for stringent obligations on immigrants’ access to welfare highlights 
two considerations. Firstly, workers’ welfare preferences matter in their party 
choice, even after purging their political ideology and education. Purging the 
latter is especially important since lower educated individuals tend to have 
authoritarian attitudes (Dekker and Ester, 1987; Häusermann and Kriesi, 
2015), which may then increase their support for radical right parties. The 
significance of welfare preferences, even after purging authoritarian attitudes, 
thus signals the growing relevance of welfare preferences to radical right 
support today, especially as welfare considerations increasingly include both 
deservingness and generosity concerns.  
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Secondly, temporary workers are indeed a heterogeneous group, especially 
as temporary contracts have proliferated among socioeconomic groups that 
had previously enjoyed permanent contracts, such as highly educated workers 
(Häusermann et al., 2015). This heterogeneity may explain why previous 
studies from the labour market dualisation literature seem to find inconsistent 
results on the relationship between temporary contracts and party choice (e.g. 
Marx and Picot, 2013; Lindvall and Rueda, 2014). The findings here thus 
highlight the relevance of disaggregating temporary workers to understand 
how their different sociodemographic background may intersect with their 
employment contracts to affect their political responses.  
These results also show that temporary workers share some similarities in 
their party preferences with automation-vulnerable workers. These results 
may also suggest that there are some overlaps between these two groups of 
workers: they may have similar concerns that inform their support for radical 
right parties. They may both worry less about imminent unemployment, but 
remain concerned about future unemployment. Such concerns may give rise 
to worries about threats to the future generosity of their unemployment 
benefits, such as welfare competition. Both temporary and automation-
vulnerable workers also suffer from the threat of status decline (Kurer, 2020; 
Mayer et al., 2015; McGann et al., 2016). Yet, they also differ in terms of their 
heterogeneity: temporary workers seem more heterogeneous than 
automation-vulnerable workers. While automation-vulnerable workers 
significantly prefer radical right parties as shown in Table 4, temporary 
workers only do so when they possess welfare chauvinist attitudes.  
 
5.4 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Although this study sheds light on political responses to automation, it is 
important to highlight the perimeters of this research which relate to three 
broad areas: theoretical, contextual, and measurement concerns.  
There are three theoretical concerns. Firstly, this study focuses on risk 
emanating from automation, and to a lesser extent, employment contracts. 
Consequently, it is worth considering whether the political outcomes observed 
here are generalisable beyond these two risk sources. Regardless of the source 
of risk, research suggests that individuals who experience elevated risk may 
hold similar welfare and status concerns (e.g. Engler and Weisstanner, 2020; 
Gidron and Hall, 2019; Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Rehm, 2009; van Oorschot 
2006; Uunk and van Oorschot, 2019). Nevertheless, vulnerable individuals 
may still respond differently due to the specificities of each risk (Kaihovaara 
and Im, 2020). For example, workers who are threatened by unemployment 
from falling labour demand during the COVID-19 pandemic may respond 
differently from workers who are threatened by unemployment from 
automation. They may respond dissimilarly because of differences in the time 
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horizon of unemployment. Risk from COVID-19 may stimulate a greater 
concern for economic vulnerability, whereas risk from automation may induce 
a greater concern for status decline and welfare competition. Such 
dissimilarities may yield differences in policy support and party choice. In 
short, even if risks from different sources yield similar concerns, they may give 
rise to dissimilar priorities. Future studies could explore the types of concerns 
and priorities which manifest from different risks, and compare their 
outcomes to those from automation. Furthermore, future studies may extend 
the analysis of such risks to support for other social policies, including 
enabling LMPs which may prevent such risks from materialising in the first 
place (Bonoli, 2013; Hemerijck, 2017).  
Secondly, I focused on differences between temporary and permanent 
contracts. However, today’s gig economy has increased the prevalence of zero-
hour contracts. Unfortunately, this dataset does not allow a precise 
identification of such workers. Likewise, it is not possible to distinguish 
workers who voluntarily downshifted into part-time contracts and those who 
did not. Distinguishing these two types of part-time workers is pertinent 
because they might perceive their risks differently. They may thus worry about 
welfare competition and status decline to different degrees, and hence vote 
differently. Furthermore, it is not possible to track changes in workers’ 
employment contracts over their employment biography in this dataset. From 
a life-course perspective, it is plausible that prior experience of insecure 
employment contracts or unemployment may influence workers’ subsequent 
political responses. Future studies could exploit datasets which facilitate such 
differentiation. 
Thirdly, I focused here on the impact of risks from automation and insecure 
employment contracts. However, workers face multiple sources of disruption 
(Autor et al., 2013; Kaihovaara and Im, 2020), and thus experience 
overlapping or intersecting risks. For instance, temporary routine workers 
may feel greater employment insecurity than permanent routine workers if 
firms seek to lower their dismissal costs (Rueda, 2005; 2014). Temporary 
workers are often cheaper and easier to dismiss than permanent workers; 
firms may simply not renew temporary worker’ contracts. Such differences in 
employment insecurity may mean that temporary and permanent routine 
workers perceive the threat of automation dissimilarly, and respond 
differently. Future studies may explore how different labour market risks 
compound and interact with each other to affect political outcomes.  
I next consider concerns about contextual effects. Firstly, this study focuses 
primarily on individual-level associations between automation risk and 
political outcomes. This emphasis on individuals is motivated by a view that 
individuals in similar occupations face relatively similar automation risks 
across different advanced capitalist economies, because some tasks are more 
easily automated than others (Gingrich, 2019; Goos et al., 2014; Thewissen 
and Rueda, 2017). Consequently, the first order of business would be to 
explore political responses to automation risk at the individual (occupational) 
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level. It is nonetheless naïve to disregard institutional differences that may 
influence individuals’ political responses to automation. Labour market 
institutions may shape the adoption of automation as well as the extent to 
which they replace workers (Fernández-Macías and Hurley, 2017; Oesch and 
Rodríguez, 2011). Social and labour market policy programmes may also 
cushion the extent to which automation displaces labour. For instance, if states 
subsidise on-the-job training programmes, workers who previously performed 
routine tasks may be retrained to perform new tasks that complement 
automation (Arntz et al., 2017; Hemerijck, 2017). Such institutional and policy 
differences mean that automation-threatened workers may perceive the threat 
of automation differently, and respond dissimilarly in different countries in 
their support for benefit conditionality policies. Sub-study I addressed such 
contextual variation by employing country dummies. Sub-study II employed 
random country intercepts and ALMPs expenditure to consider such 
contextual variation. Future studies could explore how other contextual 
differences, such as countries’ industrial make-up, labour market institutions 
and social policy expenditures adjusted for unemployment rates, affect routine 
workers’ support for benefit conditionality. It is also fruitful to examine the 
extent to which workers in similar automation-threatened occupations 
perceive the threat of automation similarly, and if their subjective perceptions 
vary across contexts and have a bearing on political outcomes.12  
Secondly, I focused on individual-level associations between automation 
risk and temporary contracts and voting outcomes. While this approach allows 
me to assess how similar groups of workers respond politically, future studies 
could explore the influence of other contextual factors. As discussed above, 
differences in labour market and social policies may influence these workers’ 
vote choice. Some of these differences may include collective bargaining 
practices, employment protection legislation (Halikiopoulu and Vlandas, 
2016; Rueda, 2014), and expenditure on passive compensation and ALMPs 
which may buffer vulnerable workers’ risk (Gingrich, 2019). Another relevant 
contextual factor relates to how political parties mobilise vulnerable workers. 
For instance, radical right parties vary in their positions on welfare issues 
(Afonso and Papadopoulos, 2015), which may explain why some radical right 
parties are more successful in mobilising this group of workers than others 
(Gingrich, 2019). Although radical right parties currently mobilise such 
workers most, it is far from certain that other parties, including mainstream 
ones, would not attempt to do the same in the near future (see Schumacher 
and van Kesbergen, 2014). Future studies may explore the contextual 
influence of other institutional factors on automation-threatened and 
temporary workers’ vote choice (e.g. Anelli et al., 2019). They may also 
examine parties’ manifestos to explore how various parties attempt to mobilise 
 
12 The ESS offers this possibility with its question on respondents’ perceived 
likelihood of unemployment in the next 6 months. 
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these voters through their programmes on welfare and positions on issues 
related to status anxiety.  
Lastly, I consider measurement concerns and first pay attention to the 
quality of RTI as a measure of automation risk. Although RTI is commonly 
used in similar studies and applied on countries other than the US (e.g. 
Gingrich, 2019; Kurer, 2020; Thewissen and Rueda, 2017), it is nevertheless 
calculated using US labour data. There are therefore reservations about its 
relevance to European workers (e.g. Fernández-Macías and Hurley, 2017). 
However, Biagi and Sebastian’s (2020) meta-review of different automation 
indices finds that most studies arrive at similar conclusions about the structure 
of employment in advanced capitalist economies today, despite them using 
different indices based on different labour data or calculations. Their study 
may thus indicate that there is broad convergence across different indicators 
about which occupations are threatened by automation. It may hence be 
justified to apply RTI outside of the US. Sub-study II applied some of these 
different automation indices and found results that are similar to those based 
on RTI. It is however arguable that RTI may be less relevant for Eastern 
European countries than West European ones due to differences in their levels 
of economic development. Although Sub-study II partially addresses this 
concern by employing country dummies in fixed-effects models or random 
country intercepts in random-effects models, future studies could delve 
further into potential differences between Eastern and Western European 
routine workers.  
A second reservation pertains to technology’s current and predicted effects 
on labour demand. The existing labour economics literature on technology 
focuses on two types of technological advancements: recent and futuristic 
ones. Measures like RTI rate occupations’ threat of displacement from current 
technologies (Autor et al., 2003; Fernández-Macías and Hurley, 2017; Goos et 
al., 2014). By contrast, measures like the Frey and Osborne index rate 
occupations’ threat of displacement from future technologies like driverless 
vehicles and algorithms and advanced computing underpinning the platform 
economy. I focused on the impact of recent technologies because present-day 
political responses to automation are probably linked to current rather than 
futuristic technological disruptions. Regardless of this theoretical stance, 
robustness checks in Sub-study II apply both types of indices and find similar 
results. In addition, Biagi and Sebastian’s (2020) meta-review finds 
substantial similarity in findings from both types of indices. Nevertheless, 
future studies could explore potential differences in political responses to 
current and future technological disruptions as they may affect dissimilar 
occupations. 
A third reservation stems from measuring automation risk at the level of 
occupations. Although this is the predominant approach in studies that 
explore similar concerns (e.g. Gingrich, 2019; Thewissen and Rueda, 2017), 
some labour economists have pointed out that automation risk varies for 
similar occupations in different sectors (eg. Cirillo, 2018). The automation 
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indices used in this dissertation do not directly account for such sectoral 
differences. Owing to collective bargaining coverage, a similar argument could 
be made about employment contracts in different sectors. In Sub-study II, I 
addressed this issue by introducing sectoral dummies during robustness 
checks and found results which were similar to the main models. Nevertheless, 
future studies could explore how sectoral differences influence vulnerable 
workers’ political responses (e.g. Anelli et al., 2019; Kurer and Gallego, 2019). 
Relatedly, workers in similar occupations may have divergent unemployment 
risk owing to dissimilar life course experiences. For instance, older workers 
who perform routine physical tasks may face greater threat than younger 
routine workers, especially if age hinders the execution of such tasks. 
Similarly, routine workers who have supervisory responsibilities may be less 
threatened than routine workers who do not. Likewise, female routine workers 
could experience higher unemployment risk than male routine workers in 
countries and sectors where male breadwinner norms are dominant. Firms 
may adjust their dismissal strategies to public views that consider it less 
acceptable for men than women to be unemployed. Future studies could 
disaggregate automation risk beyond the occupation level. 
A fourth reservation relates to disentangling the impacts of welfare 
competition and status decline concern. Disentangling their corresponding 
impacts here is challenging because a single measure of risk (RTI) proxies both 
concerns. Additionally, the dataset does not facilitate a reliable or precise 
disentanglement of these two effects. Furthermore, both concerns were 
hypothesised to have similar effects which made it more difficult to 
disentangle their respective effects. Although welfare competition and status 
decline concerns may yield overlapping outcomes on benefit conditionality 
support and radical right vote, these similarities may not extend to other 
political outcomes. For instance, if another party chooses to appeal to status 
insecure voters without mobilising their welfare competition concerns, 
individuals who prioritise status insecurity may prefer this party more than 
individuals who prioritise welfare competition. Future studies may leverage 
datasets which facilitate researchers to disentangle effects from these two 
worries. Future studies may also examine the extent to which political 
outcomes from these concerns converge or diverge. 
The last concern pertains to this study’s exclusive use of the ESS. Although 
it is a high quality dataset, it has some limitations.13 Some of them have been 
discussed above, such as its imprecision at measuring different employment 
contracts present today. Others include the lack of details about conditions 
and sanctions applied to unemployment benefit recipiency. Knotz (2018) 
noted that sanctions might not be applied at the first instance of offence, but 
only for repeated breaches of obligations. The ESS does not contain questions 
which measure respondents’ opinion for benefit conditionality policies at this 
 
13 This research did not directly engage with human participants in the 
research process.  
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level of precision. Future studies could exploit other datasets which capture 






As concerns grow about the adoption of workplace automation, especially 
if the COVID-19 pandemic spurs a further uptake of such technological capital, 
it is timely to assess the political implications of this labour market disruption. 
I focused on the impact of automation risk on support for benefit 
conditionality policies, and the impact of automation risk and temporary 
contracts on party choice. Although each research question examines specific 
political responses to labour market disruptions, I find a common theme 
throughout these different political responses: automation risk and temporary 
contracts present status decline and welfare competition worries to workers 
that then inform their political responses.  
At a policy level, this means that political parties and policymakers should 
consider innovative policies that assuage such concerns to avert a political 
backlash to automation. It also means that traditional social policies that 
compensate for labour market disadvantage, such as generous unemployment 
benefit, may not stem the tide of worries experienced by automation-
vulnerable workers. It is also uncertain if basic income, which provides 
unconditional generous redistribution to address economic worries rather 
than status and welfare competition fears, may stem the political fallout from 
automation. Instead, policies that recognise and redress the specific threats 
and concerns that automation-vulnerable workers face are required. Yet, such 
policies may appear to fall outside the scope of most social and welfare policies. 
It then begs the question: are there relevant social policies which may mitigate 
the political fallout from automation? 
The short answer to this question is, yes. The gradual disappearance of jobs 
that had previously accorded economic and status security is at the root of 
automation-vulnerable workers’ worries. In this regard, social and labour 
market policies that promote the retention of such jobs are perhaps key to 
averting the political fallout from automation. By retention, I do not only mean 
the quantity (employment) of jobs, but I also mean the quality (relevance) of 
such jobs. In short, automation-threatened jobs may need to be reconfigured 
to include new tasks that complement automation. On-the-job training 
programmes that enable workers’ to transit seamlessly and perform these new 
tasks are thus crucial. By changing the composition of tasks within routine jobs 
and equipping workers who performed such jobs with updated skills, there is 
a greater chance that previously-automation vulnerable workers may continue 
to receive economic security and status relevance from being in their 
“updated” jobs. In short, training programmes and industrial policies that are 
well coordinated with firms may be policymakers’ best bet to avert the political 
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